Abstract: Multi-domain competition is developing for disintegrating the component of the opponent’s operational system and winning advantage in decision space. Island air defense is a typical multi-domain security problem, which dramatically increases the complexity of decision-making by considering different factors such as multi-stages decisions, multi-domain settings, imperfection information, and uncertain events. However, current research on island air defense security problems is sparse and lacks consideration of key factors. To provide support for assisting human commanders to take wise decisions in a complex environment, we build a multi-domain multi-state island air defense model and propose responding solving algorithms. We study the whole progress of island air defense and propose a multi-domain, multi-stage imperfection information security game that formulates critical characters in the adversarial scenario of island air defense. In addition, considering a bounded rational opponent’s possible strategies, we propose an opponent-aware Monte Carlo counterfactual regret minimization algorithm for learning a robust defensive strategy in the security game. We evaluate our methods in various adversarial scenarios. The results show that our equilibrium learning method can effectively play against an opponent with bounded rationality and significantly outperform some advanced algorithms.

Key words: island air defense, counterfactual regret minimization, Nash equilibrium, security game, cyber-physical system